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 Abstract 
In the last three years, there has been a great deal of turbulence in defense 
acquisition policy. This has led to confusion within the acquisition workforce over the 
major policy thrusts, terminology, and unobvious implications of the changes.  The new 
acquisition framework has added complexity, with more phases and delineations of 
activity -- and both the number and level of decision reviews have been increased.  
Decision reviews are typically used as top management level control gates, and are 
also a feature of centralized control within a bureaucracy.  Although the current stated 
policy is to foster an environment supporting flexibility and innovation, the new 
framework will cause Program Managers to devote more time and other resources 
managing the decision bureaucracy.  Moreover, the implicit aspects of the still new 
model have not been fully realized, and may result in policy that actually lengthens 
programs and delivers yesterday’s technology tomorrow -- counter to goals of rapid 
transformation.  The framework, and its associated requirements for senior level 
reviews, are opposed to the rapid and evolutionary policy espoused, and are counter to 
appropriate management strategies for a transformational era.
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Introduction 
The issuance of Department of Defense Directive 5000.11 and Instruction 
5000.22 on May 12, 2003, is the third significant revision of acquisition policy in as many 
years.  Looking further back, these three revisions of regulatory guidance had evolved 
from two previous versions in 19913 and 19964.  Each had its major thrusts and tenets, 
and perhaps of most importance to Program Managers, modifications to the “Defense 
Systems Acquisition Management Process” 5 or “Defense Acquisition Framework”6 
which is the broad paradigm of phases and milestone reviews in the life of an 
acquisition program.  The purpose of this research is to examine the evolution of this 
framework and draw attention to the explicit and implicit aspects of recent changes to 
the various models to better understand its current form. 
This latest version of the 5000 series was actually drafted in the documents 
rescinding its predecessor.  According to his memorandum signed on October 30, 2002, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said the series required revision “to create 
an acquisition policy environment that fosters efficiency, flexibility, creativity and 
innovation.”7  Interim guidance was issued, along with the rescission of the series, as a 
temporary replacement, outlining principles and policies to govern the operation of the 
new Defense acquisition system.  Among them: 
3.1  Responsibility for acquisition of systems shall be decentralized to the 
maximum extent practicable (emphasis mine).  
                                            
1 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003. 
2 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 
May 12, 2003. 
3 USD(A) Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, February 23, 1991. 
4 USD(A&T) Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, Defense Acquisition, March 15, 1996. 
5 Defense Systems Acquisition Management Process, Defense Systems Management College, January 
1997. 
6 Defense Acquisition Framework, Defense Systems Management College, 2001. 
7 Wolfowitz, Paul, Memorandum for Director, Washington Headquarters Services, Cancellation of DoD 
5000 Defense Acquisition Policy Documents, October 30, 2002. 
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 3.18  The PM shall be the single point of accountability (emphasis mine). 
for accomplishment of program objectives for total life cycle systems 
management, including sustainment. 
3.27  It shall be DoD policy to minimize reporting requirements (emphasis 
mine). Nevertheless, complete and current program information is 
essential to the acquisition process.  Consistent with the tables of required 
regulatory and statutory information appearing in reference, decision 
authorities shall require PMs and other participants in the defense 
acquisition process to present only the minimum information necessary 
(emphasis mine). to understand program status and make informed 
decisions.8 
During the period between rescission and re-issuance of the regulatory guidance, 
DoD officials said discussions revolved around changes to give program managers 
more latitude to be innovative in applying concepts like evolutionary acquisition, and 
relieving them of the constraints of an overly prescriptive policy: 
Less prescriptive 5000-series documents could also enhance program 
managers' abilities to use their experience, best business practices and 
innovation “to structure and execute a program in a manner best suited to its 
particular circumstances…. 
…The old way of doing business ‘was too focused on process vs. 
outcomes.’ Instead of telling [program managers] they have to satisfy a 
requirement in a certain way, now we're [saying]: 'Here's the requirement; 
you know your program, do what best suits the particular conditions of 
your program but meet the requirement.' The new guidelines will put the 
full weight of OSD policy behind creative program managers who in the 
past likely would be constrained by the Pentagon bureaucracy by making 
them operate according to rules that may not be necessary to achieve a 
desired outcome…9 
 
                                            
8 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Defense Acquisition, Attachment 1, The Defense Acquisition 
System, October 30, 2002, (Interim Guidance 5000.1, p. 6). 
9 Costa, Keith J., “5000.2 Changes Await Approval,” Inside The Pentagon, January 16, 2003. 
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 Paramount in the objectives of the new policy is improved warfighting capability 
from projects and programs that are well managed.  A well managed project is generally 
considered to be one that is optimized for effectiveness in its planning phases but 
emphasizes efficiency in its implementation phases, that include commissioning, startup 
and close out.”10  To this could also be added “…and, in the eyes of the customer, is 
perceived as satisfactory in use,” or in defense terms--operational effectiveness and 
suitability. 
Beyond the business aspects of program management, measurement of system 
effectiveness and suitability are the principal test objectives sought from full operational 
testing late in the life of most projects, and just before deployment of the program’s 
products to the warfighting force.  Operational effectiveness and suitability are the key 
success indicators by which the product will ultimately be judged, if not against which 
decisions can be taken during the project.  However, efficiency in cost and schedule still 
predominate as the more apparent and quantifiable measures of project success prior 
to full operational assessment. 
The current policy makes clear that it is the Milestone Decision Authority – not 
the Program Manager – who is responsible for the overall program: 
3.4  The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) is the designated individual 
with overall responsibility for a program (emphasis mine).  The MDA shall 
have the authority to approve entry of an acquisition program into the next 
phase of the acquisition process and shall be accountable for cost, 
schedule, and performance reporting to higher authority, including 
Congressional reporting. 
3.5  The Program Manager (PM) is the designated individual with 
responsibility for and authority to accomplish program objectives for 
development, production, and sustainment to meet the user's operational 
needs.  The PM shall be accountable for credible cost, schedule, and 
performance reporting to the MDA (emphasis mine). 
                                            
10 Project Management Guidelines (Private BC Corporation), 1995, Wideman Comparative Glossary of 
Project Management Terms v3.1, 2002. 
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 4.3.5  Streamlined and Effective Management.  Responsibility for the 
acquisition of systems shall be decentralized to the maximum extent 
practicable.  The MDA shall provide a single individual with sufficient 
authority (emphasis mine) to accomplish MDA-approved program 
objectives for development, production, and sustainment.  The MDA shall 
ensure accountability and maximize credibility in cost, schedule, and 
performance reporting.11 
It is also clear that together, the Program Manager and Milestone Decision 
Authority share responsibility for development and oversight of the program: 
4.3.1  Flexibility.  There is no one best way to structure an acquisition 
program to accomplish the objective of the Defense Acquisition System.  
MDAs and PMs shall tailor program strategies and oversight, including 
documentation of program information, acquisition phases, the timing and 
scope of decision reviews, and decision levels, to fit the particular 
conditions of that program, consistent with applicable laws and regulations 
and the time-sensitivity of the capability need.12 
Though the 5000 series provides guidance for all levels, or Acquisition 
Categories (ACAT), of programs, its language is particularly applicable to the largest, 
ACAT I, Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP).  In such cases, the MDA is the 
Defense Acquisition Executive, who also chairs the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) as 
a decision making body for program milestone reviews.  And while the wording above 
might indicate that the MDA and PM jointly plan or collaborate in some way on program 
strategy, there are in fact both a Component Acquisition Executive and Program 
Executive Officer in the hierarchy between them, and direct communication between 
MDA and PM is infrequent.  Other top management stakeholders are OSD staff 
principals who sit in membership on the Defense Acquisition Board, where milestone 
decision reviews are conducted.  Communication between PM and OSD staff principals 
is more frequent, especially via the Overarching Integrated Product Team process.13 
                                            
11 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 2003. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) Washington, DC 20301-3000 
DoD Integrated Product and Process Development Handbook, August 1998. 
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 The very latest DoD 5000 policy changes have come during a time of DoD 
Transformation, which, while larger in scope than solely equipment and technology, is 
chiefly focused on changes to force structure and weapons employment capabilities.  
The DoD uses three Decision Support Systems to manage weapons modernization via 
requirements generation, resource allocation and acquisition of systems (The Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System, Planning, Programming Budgeting 
and Execution process, and the Defense Acquisition System, respectively).  Change, to 
a greater and lesser degree, is occurring in all three systems to facilitate the 
transformational era.  These process changes require re-education and adaptation by 
all involved in them for proper implementation, and are in all cases significant.  This 
study considers only changes to the Defense Acquisition System framework and its use 
as a decision making tool. 
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 The Challenges of Defense Program Management 
Defense systems in particular, known for their size and technological pursuits, 
are seen as among the most challenging of projects.  Gadeken, building upon previous 
studies at the Defense Systems Management College, et al., concluded that the Project 
Manager competency of systematic and innovative thinking were among the most 
needed and critical in order to accommodate growing complexities.14 
Program Managers and policy makers have long realized that of these three 
Decision Support Systems available to the DoD, two of them are fittingly event-based, 
but one (PPBE) is calendar-driven by congressional authorization and appropriation.  
While any project requires the accurate estimation of costs and time to execute, the 
annual cycle of PPBE necessitates the total forecasting of annually incremented 
program resources for the near and far term, and across multiple “colors of money.”  It 
is this same system that has long been blamed for instability in DoD programs, as high 
level adjustments are made each year that trickle down to programs in the form of 
decrements.15 
Inherent difficulty in the management of any program is exacerbated for the DoD 
by several additional factors, which have become even more apparent in the last twenty 
years.  Large defense systems are very complex systems, consisting of hardware and 
software, multiple suppliers, etc. and requiring design approaches that can alleviate 
complexity via decomposition into simpler subsets, etc.  Rapid technology changes, 
yielding obsolescence, have become particularly problematic for very large systems 
with acquisition life cycles spanning a long period of time.  Thus, it may not even be 
                                            
14 Gadeken, Owen C., “Project Managers as Leaders – Competencies of Top Performers,” RD&A, 
January – February 1997. 
15 Johnson, Stuart, Libicki, Martin C. and Treverton, Gregory F., New Challenges New Tools for Defense 
Decisionmaking, Rand, 2003. 
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 feasible to fully define the operational capabilities and functional characteristics of the 
entire system before commencing advanced development.16  
A series of influential GAO reports on defense acquisition from 1996 through 
2002 concluded that the DoD had repeatedly spent more time and money than originally 




                                           
Carefully assess technology17 and separate its development from product 
(advanced) development (i.e. mature the candidate technologies before 
commitment to advanced development)18 
Move to a “knowledge-based” approach, to learn more about a design’s 
capability to satisfy requirements and a prototype’s ability to be manufactured, 
earlier in the process.19 
Change the environment to allow PMs to identify unknowns as high risks without 
suffering criticism and loss of support.20 
The DoD 5000 series acknowledges these many complexities and difficulties 
facing MDAs and PMs in their management and oversight of large weapon system 
developments.  An approach to mitigate these technological challenges, especially in 
the post-2000 series, is evolutionary acquisition, referred to by some outside of DoD as 
progressive acquisition.  Also advocated by the General Accounting Office, it has 
evolved worldwide as a concept over the past two decades.  It is an incremental 
development approach, using iterative development cycles versus a single grand 
design.  Described succinctly by the Western European Armaments Group, the 
progressive acquisition approach is: 
 
16 Pitette, Giles, “Progressive Acquisition and the RUP: Comparing and Combining Iterative Process for 
Acquisition and Software Development,” The Rational Edge, November 2001. 
17 GAO, “Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition – Mature Technologies Needed to Reduce Risks,” 02-39, 
October 2001. 
18 GAO, “Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes,” 
NSIAD-99-162, July 1999. 
19 GAO, “Best Practices – Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves Acquisition 
Outcomes,” 02-701, July 2002. 
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 a strategy to acquire a large and complex system, which is expected to 
change over its lifecycle. The final system is obtained by upgrades of 
system capability through a series of operational increments. (It) aims to 
minimize many of the risks associated with the length and size of the 
development, as well as requirements volatility and evolution of 
technology.21 
Pittete explains further: 
An essential goal of (progressive acquisition) is the rapid fielding of a 
usable system that not only addresses an initial and validated statement of 
needs, but also anticipates iterative upgrades of system capability as 
development progresses through a series of increments.  Each successive 
increment yields an operational version of the system that meets a pre-
specified subset of the overall system requirements.  
Continuous user feedback based on previously fielded increments is an 
essential element of the approach.  It may significantly influence the 
definition and development of later increments.  In the same way, 
technology updates may be accommodated across increments, reflecting 
the evolution or obsolescence of hardware and software items, including 
commercial off-the-shelf products. 
This approach continues until the final system configuration is achieved.22 
Very similar in description, DoD’s adaptation of this approach as “evolutionary 
acquisition” is a major policy thrust in the series, and is the stated “preferred approach” 
toward all new system developments.  It is described most fully in DoDI 5000.2: 
3.3  Evolutionary Acquisition  is the preferred DoD strategy for rapid 
acquisition of mature technology for the user.  An evolutionary approach 
delivers capability in increments, recognizing, up front, the need for future 
capability improvements.  The objective is to balance needs and available 
capability with resources, and to put capability into the hands of the user 
quickly.  The success of the strategy depends on consistent and 
                                                                                                                                             
20 GAO, “Successful Application to Weapon Acquisitions Requires Changes in DoD’s Environment,” 
NSIAD-98-56, February 1998. 
21 Western European Armaments Group WEAG TA-13 Acquisition Programme, Guidance on the Use of 
Progressive Acquisition, Version 2, November 2000. 
22 Pitette, Giles, “Progressive Acquisition and the RUP: Comparing and Combining Iterative Process for 
Acquisition and Software Development,” The Rational Edge, November 2001. 
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 continuous definition of requirements, and the maturation of technologies 
that lead to disciplined development and production of systems that 
provide increasing capability towards a materiel concept.23 
This particular policy thrust is important to this study as it pertains to the 
framework of phases and decision reviews of a program moving toward completion.  It 
is meant to change the way programs are structured and products delivered. – actually 
separating projects into smaller, less complex increments.  It is, additionally, one of 
several aspects of the new policy that affect the framework and its use as a 
management control mechanism. 
                                            
23 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 
May 12, 2003. 
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 Organizational Control Theory and Defense 
Acquisition 
Sylvester and Ferrara provided an insightful view of the organizational struggle 
within OSD to adopt the evolutionary acquisition policy.24  Evolutionary acquisition can 
even be viewed as analogous to these authors’ iterative approach to policy 
implementation via “muddling through” – (i.e. successive limited comparisons) versus 
using a more comprehensive “grand design” approach.25  Perhaps most impressive in 
this paper is the intra-organizational complexities and diverse interests that are 
revealed, and in the authors’ assertions that policy ambiguity and organizational conflict 
are not necessarily counterproductive. They further describe in some detail the 
distribution of power affecting weapon system acquisitions among stakeholders outside 
of DoD (i.e. Congress and the defense industry) as well as within (i.e. Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and Director of Operational Test & Evaluation 
DOT&E), Comptroller, etc.).  Vital to the interests of many is the need for bureaucratic 
control over the acquisition process.  As others have observed through recent decades, 
each of these powerful stakeholders perceives and “exercises an oversight 
responsibility to ensure that laws and regulations are observed and programs pursued 
efficiently.”26 
Wideman also advocated progressive (evolutionary) acquisition, and recognized 
senior management responsibility for financial accountability in private and public 
projects and their preference for central control.  He noted three problems with senior 
management control over complex developments such as software enterprises like 
                                            
24 Sylvester, Richard K. and Ferrara, Joseph A., Conflict And Ambiguity Implementing Evolutionary 
Acquisition, Acquisition Review Quarterly - Winter 2003. 
25 Lindblom, C. E. (1959). The Science of Muddling Through, Public Administration Review, 19 (Spring), 
(Reprinted in Perspectives on Public Bureaucracy (2nd ed.), pp. 132-150, by F. A. Kramer (Ed.), 1977, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers). 
26 Fox, J. Ronald, The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition, Harvard Business School 
Press, 1988. 
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 Defense Information Systems, even when projects were not particularly large or lengthy.  




                                           
Has difficulty staying abreast of ongoing developmental efforts 
Is not technically prepared for the dynamics of project changes 
Has too large a span of control to effectively manage locally 
Thus, he suggests that, as a minimum, better means of communicating are 
required to serve both the needs of developer and sponsor.27 
The above observations in large, complex programs align with classic 
contingency theory, which holds that organizational structures must change in response 
to contingencies of size, technology, and as external environments become more 
complex and dynamic.  Indeed, it has long been accepted that when faced with 
uncertainty (a situation with less information than is needed) the management response 
must either be to redesign the organization for the task at hand, or improve 
communication flows and processing.28  Van Creveld applies this same principle to 
command and control of combat elements in war, stating that the command structure 
must either create a greater demand for information (vertically, horizontally, or both) and 
increase the size and complexity of the directing organ, or enable the local forces to 
deal with the situation semi-independently.  His central theme is that decentralized 
control is the superior method of dealing with uncertainty, whether with the task at hand 
or with transformation of the organization itself.29  
Research by Van de Ven and Delbecq has further shown that as complexity and 
uncertainty increase, hierarchical management control strategies are less favored than 
adaptation to less formal and horizontal communication channels, and the effectiveness 
 
27 Wideman, R. Max, Progressive Acquisition and the RUP Part I: Defining the Problem and Common 
Terminology, The Rational Edge, 2002. 
28 Galbraith, J. R., 1973, Designing Complex Organization, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley. 
29 Van Creveld, Martin, Command in War, Harvard University Press, 1985. 
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 of formal controls becomes less effective.30  To continue discussion of management 
control as it might relate to defense acquisition, we should perhaps next consider 
organizations and their environments in very broad terms. 
Gareth Morgan traced organizational theory through the past century and depicts 
organizations as a variety of images, or metaphors in his treatise, Images of 
Organization.  He claims these “images” of organizations are actually metaphors, much 
like our graphic depictions of projects, and uses the machine, the organism, the brain, 
and others to illustrate approaches to organization.  He describes many large and 
complex organizations structured as machine bureaucracies, with routinized processes 
of administration the way a machine routinizes production.  He discusses at length how 
well the machine bureaucracy fit Western society organizations in the period of 
industrialization, particularly under conditions of straightforward tasks, a predictable and 
stable environment, and where precision, efficiency and compliance were desired.  He 
also notes today’s transition from industrial age to information age, with its 
accompanying implications of rapid change and turbulence.  He warns that large 
hierarchical, mechanistic organizational forms have difficulty adapting to change and 
are not designed for innovation: 
The machine bureaucracy and the divisionalized form tend to be 
ineffective except under conditions where tasks and environment are 
simple and stable.  Their highly centralized systems of control tend to 
make them slow and ineffective in dealing with changing circumstances.  
While appropriate for firms that are production driven, they are often 
inappropriate for firms that are market or environment driven.31  
Another classical concept of organizational theory is Ashby’s Law of Requisite 
Variety, which states that the internal regulatory mechanisms of a system must be as 
diverse as its environment in order to cope with the variety of challenges imposed by it.  
Moreover, organizational evolution and survival are dependent upon it, and capacities 
                                            
30 Delbecq, André L., Van de Ven, Andrew and Gustafson, David, Group Techniques for Program 
Planning, 2nd edition, Greenbriar Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 1986. 
31 Morgan, Gareth, 1997, Images of Organization, Sage Publications. 
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 are enhanced when variety is built at the point of interaction with the environment.32  
This too suggests that the organization’s structure and control strategy must be 
matched to its environment to enhance performance, and that open and flexible styles 
and processes of management are required for dynamic market and technological 
conditions.  Further research by Burrell and Morgan indicate that any incongruence 
among management processes and the organization’s environment tend to reduce 
organizational effectiveness.33  
In their book, The Intelligent Organization, Gifford & Elizabeth Pinchot make an 
even stronger case for decentralized management in large complex organizations faced 
with transformational change.  They suggest that as organizations today face increasing 
complexity, rapidity of change, distributed information, and new forms of competition, 
organizations must grow more intelligent to confront and defeat the diverse and 
simultaneous challenges.  They posit that for an organization to be fully intelligent, it 
must use the intelligence of its members all the way down the hierarchy.  They note that 
with distributed information there is distributed intelligence, and failure to render 
authority to those closest to the problem will yield lethargy, mediocre performance, or 
worse – paralysis.  Control will be maintained, and anarchy will not occur -- but neither 
will success.34 
What the cumulative research appears to support is that, for large complex 
hierarchies such as the Department of Defense, decentralized control and 
empowerment should be an organizational strength, given today’s environment of 
program complexity, evolving requirements, and rapidly changing technology. 
                                            
32 Ashby, W. R., An Introduction to Cybernetics, London: Chapman & Hall, 1960. 
33 Morgan, Gareth, 1997, Images of Organization, Sage Publications. 
34 Pinchot, Gifford and Elizabeth, The End of Bureaucracy and the Rise of the Intelligent Organization. 
Berrett-Koehler Publishers, San Francisco, 1993. 
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 An Examination of Project Management Life Cycle 
Models 
Models have long been used to illustrate the integration of functional efforts 
across the timeline of a project or program.  It is the successful integration of these 
diverse elements that is the very essence of project management.  Models also help us 
to visualize the total scope of a project and “see” its division into phases and decision 
points.  The interaction and overlapping of many and varied activities such as planning, 
engineering, test and evaluation, logistics, manufacturing, etc. must be adroitly 
managed for optimum attainment of project cost, schedule and technical performance 
outcomes.   
Project Management Institute 
The Project Management Institute’s Project Management Body of Knowledge 
(PMBOK®) provides generally accepted knowledge and practices in the broad field of 
project management.35 Striving for commonality across diverse business areas and 
product commodities, it provides a generic framework as a structure for understanding 
the management of a project or program.  In the figure below (Fig. 1.), a project life 
cycle is depicted as costs and staffing relative to time. 
                                            
35 Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® 
Guide), 2000 Edition, Pennsylvania, 2000. 
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Fig. 1.  Sample Generic Project Life Cycle, Adapted from PMBOK® 2000 
Project Management difficulty climbs along the scale of system complexity and 
technological uncertainty, and is simplified by division of the effort into phases, with 
points between for management review and decision.   
Because projects are unique undertakings, they involve a degree of 
uncertainty.  Organizations performing projects will usually divide each 
project into several project phases to provide better management control 
and appropriate links to the ongoing operations of the performing 
organization.  Collectively, the project phases are known as the project life 
cycle…. 
…Each project phase normally includes a set of defined work products 
designed to establish the desired level of management control (emphasis 
mine). 
The conclusion of a project phase is generally marked by a review of both 
key deliverables and project performance in order to (a) determine if the 
project should continue into its next phase and (b) detect and correct 
errors cost effectively.  These phase-end reviews are often called phase 
exits, stage gates, or kill points.36 
The institute acknowledges a variety of approaches to modeling project life 
cycles, with some so detailed that they actually become management methodologies.  
                                            
36 Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® 
Guide), 2000 Edition, Pennsylvania, 2000. 
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 Illustration of generic project management processes or activities across time are 
depicted thus (Fig.2.): 
 
Fig. 2.  Project Management Processes, Adapted from PMBOK® 200037 
Of particular note in this model is the delineation of distinct yet overlapping 
processes, across a project or within phases, to initiate, plan, execute, control, and 
eventually close the phase or project.  The PMBOK® provides examples of how various 
industry business areas model their “acquisition” process.  A glimpse into the project 
models of other types of enterprises may serve for edification and to provide some other 
perspectives for viewing the continually evolving Department of Defense model. 
Construction Projects 
In the construction industry (Fig. 3.) a project is represented by four main phases 
(stages): 
                                            
37 Ibid. 
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Fig. 3.  Representative Construction Project Life Cycle, Adapted from PMBOK® 200038 
Feasibility Stage – In this first phase, projects are formulated, feasibility studies 
are conducted, and an overall project strategy is designed and approved by a sponsor.  
Then, a go/no-go decision is made at the end of this phase to proceed. 
Planning and Design Stage – The base (preliminary) design is completed, cost 
and schedule are fully estimated, contract terms and conditions are defined, and further 
detailed planning is conducted.  Major contracts are awarded to performing 
organizations at the end of this phase. 
Production Stage – The manufacturing, delivery, civil works, installation, and 
testing are conducted such that the facility is substantially complete at the end of this 
phase. 
                                            
38 Ibid. 
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 Turnover and Start-up Stage - Final testing and maintenance occur in this phase.  
The facility becomes fully operational at the end of this phase. 
Civil construction is typically viewed as being on the relatively low side of risk and 
complexity, though several building or highway projects have become highly profiled 
when large overruns have occurred.  The Denver Airport and Boston Central 
Artery/Tunnel projects prove that underestimates of project difficulty are not peculiar to 
the Department of Defense.  In fact, a study of almost 600 projects across twenty-five 
public and private business areas revealed that DoD weapon system project cost 
growth variances ranked in the lower half of the population sample.39  Note that in this 
model, the planned work effort is actually quantified on the vertical axis of the model, 
similar to what would be found on an earned value management diagram as budgeted 
cost of work scheduled. 
Pharmaceutical Projects 
The Food and Drug Administration model is shown below to represent projects 
within the pharmaceutical industry.  Pharmaceutical endeavor is actually believed by 
some to be more analogous to the DoD acquisition enterprise -- with its orientation upon 
emerging technology for new treatment options, graduated levels of testing, and strict 
regulatory requirements for approval.  Human lives may actually be at stake as well.  
The magnitude of effort in terms of costs and time is similar to many DoD projects, with 
average time from applied research to market being about ten years and an average 
investment of $897 million per new investigational drug.40 
The framework (Fig. 4.) also employs a highly controlled testing and approval 
process for prove-out of safety and efficacy (similar to DoD’s operational suitability and 
effectiveness.)  In both processes, government funded research contributes to 
advancement of the science through basic research.  However, unlike today’s weapon 
                                            
39 Blery, F., Cost Growth and the Use of Competitive Acquisition Strategies, Journal of the National 
Estimating Society, Vol. 6, No. 3, Fall 1985. 
40 Ezzell, Carol, The Price of Pills, Scientific American, July 2003. 
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 system acquisition, it is primarily market forces that drive pharmaceutical industry 
investments and progress through applied research and advanced development. 
 
Fig. 4.  Representative Pharmaceutical Project Life Cycle, Adapted from PMBOK® 2000 
Discovery and Screening Phase - This phase includes basic and applied 
research to identify candidates for preclinical testing.  Market needs are also compared 
to emerging technology. 
Preclinical Development - Laboratory and animal testing is conducted to 
determine safety and efficacy of the new drug, as well as preparation and filing of an 
Investigational New Drug (IND) application. 
Registration(s) Workup - This phase includes Clinical Phase I, II, and III tests 
with increasing numbers of human subjects in each sub-phase. Preparation and filing of 
a New Drug Application (NDA) completes the phase. 
Postsubmission Activity - During this period additional work is conducted as 
required to support Food and Drug Administration review of the NDA to obtain approval.  
Time in this phase alone has averaged 20 months in the past decade.41 
                                            
41 US Food and Drug Administration Center for Drug Evaluation and Research. 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/default.htm, Approval Times for Priority and Standard NMEs - Calendar 
Years 1993-2002, (Updated through 12/31/2002, Posted 1/14/2003). 
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 Post marketing studies (additional clinical research) can also be an extensive 
effort after FDA approval (similar to Operations and Support Phase in DoD).  Recent 
FDA process reforms have led to fast-tracking initiatives and other rapid approval 
programs for priority medical needs, all in an effort to reduce the total cycle time of a 
new drug endeavor. 
Software Projects 
The software industry, which long used a linear “waterfall” model of development, 
later adopted a multiple-iteration paradigm of cyclical developments.  Muench, et al. 
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Fig. 5.  Representative Software Development Life Cycle, Adapted from PMBOK® 2000 
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 Proof-of-concept cycle – to capture business requirements, define goals for 
proof-of-concept, produce conceptual system design, design and construct the proof-of-
concept, produce acceptance test plans, conduct risk analysis and make 
recommendations. 
First build cycle - derive system requirements, define goals for first build, produce 
logical system design, design and construct the first build, produce system test plans, 
evaluate the first build, and make recommendations. 
Second build cycle - derive subsystem requirements, define goals for second 
build, produce physical design, construct the second build, produce system test plans, 
evaluate the second build and make recommendations. 
Final cycle - complete unit requirements, final design, construct final build, 
perform unit, subsystem, system, and acceptance tests.42 
Wideman states that, though the graphical representation of this spiral 
development does not clearly convey the process, it does convey progress throughout 
the project life span.  And good features of this framework are the constant interplay 
with the end user, and the enabling of requirements discovery as initial work 
progresses.  Note that in this model, full realization of requirements does not occur until 
the final build cycle.  The process continues until the user is satisfied or until resources 
are exhausted.  Cautions are for the need for discipline at the lowest levels to remain 
cost and scope conscious, lest cycles be added indefinitely.43  
Software has always been unique in that there are no manufacturing costs per 
se. This affords faster time periods between iterations of development and testing and 
at less cost than hardware tool-up, component procurement, fabrication and assembly, 
etc. The spiral software model helped developers to recognize that end users do not 
                                            
42 Muench, Dean, The Sybase Development Framework, Sybase, CA, 1994. 
43 Wideman, R. Max, Software Development and Linearity Part 1, ICFAI PRESS, Projects & Profits, 
Vancouver, BC, Canada, March 2003. 
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 always fully know their requirements until they see the product in use – something 
systems engineers have known for a long time. 
Systems Engineering Within Development Projects 
Defined by the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE): 
Systems Engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and means to 
enable the realization of successful systems. It focuses on defining 
customer needs and required functionality early in the development cycle, 
documenting requirements, then proceeding with design synthesis and 
system validation while considering the complete problem.  Systems 
Engineering integrates all the disciplines and specialty groups into a team 
effort forming a structured development process that proceeds from 
concept to production to operation.  Systems Engineering considers both 
the business and the technical needs of all customers with the goal of 
providing a quality product that meets the user needs.44 
After years in the defense and aerospace industry, authors Forsberg and Mooz 
saw developmental project management in a systems engineering sense, as a V-model, 
decomposing complexity and flowing down requirements on the left side, then 
integrating technologies and verifying attainment of customer requirements on the right 
side (Fig 6.). 
 
                                            
44 International Council on Systems Engineering, http://www.incose.org/whatis.html, June 1999. 
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Fig. 6. The “Vee” Model, Adapted from Visualizing Project Management45 
Key in this paradigm or framework is the relationship between sides of the “Vee,” 
particularly with regard to requirements “traceability,” for functional and physical linkage 
and accountability throughout development.  While most applicable to actual product or 
advanced development, the model does allow for concurrent activities to exploit the 
potential for schedule efficiency as well as development iterations for requirements 
definition and user feedback. 
Projects seem to be better visualized with graphic representations or models.  
They help us reduce complexity and thereby understand it.  They can be used, as we 
will see in the next group of models, to reduce investment risk via investment “exit 
points” (Mooz calls “control gates”) and to prevent progression beyond the appropriate 
stage.  They help us to delineate and allocate our diverse project management efforts.  
There are similarities and differences between business areas, with potential for idea 
sharing.  In fact, we have shared much from the spiral software model in order to 
embrace evolutionary acquisition as a preferred acquisition strategy for weapon 
systems. 
                                            
45 Forsberg, Kevin, Mooz, M. and Cotterham, H., Visualizing Project Management, 2nd Edition, Wiley, 
2000. 
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 With some context provided by these previous models we can now briefly 
examine the evolution of the DoD 5000 series framework with six versions of the project 
life cycle management model used by DoD over the last sixteen years.   
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 An Examination of the Evolving Defense Acquisition 
Framework 
Models of program structure are important to the Department of Defense in 
conveying the overall acquisition strategy.  According to the Acquisition Strategy Guide, 
the structure and schedule portion of the acquisition strategy defines: 
…the relationship among acquisition phases, decision milestones, 
solicitations, contract awards, system engineering design reviews, 
contract deliveries, T&E periods, production releases, and operational 
deployment objectives.  It must describe the phase transitions and the 
degree of concurrency entailed.  It is a visual overview and picture 
presentation of the acquisition strategy… depicted on an event-driven time 
line diagram…46 
Looking back sixteen years there have actually been two “families” of defense 
acquisition life cycle models or frameworks: Pre-2000-era and Post-2000-era.  The first 
of the Pre-2000-era models to consider here is the Life Cycle Systems Management 







                                            
46 Defense Systems Management College Press, Acquisition Strategy Guide (4th Edition), December 
1999. 
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Fig. 7.  Life Cycle Systems Management Model 
This Life Cycle Systems Management Model consisted of six phases of pre-
acquisition and acquisition activity, five key decision points, and an additional decision 
review optional for major modifications to a fielded system.47 It is important to note that 
not all systems underwent the decision reviews described below: 
Milestone 0 Decision - Approval of mission need and program initiation, authority 
to budget for a new program 
Phase 0 - Concept Exploration & Definition Phase – development of an 
acquisition strategy, concepts to be carried further into the next phase for development, 
rationale for elimination of other concepts, cost, schedule and operational goals and 
thresholds established.  
Milestone I Decision - Approval to proceed to Demonstration/Validation Phase – 
key areas of technical risk identified with plans to reduce them before Milestone II. 
                                            
47 Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs, 
September 1, 1987. 
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 Phase I – Concept Demonstration/Validation Phase – preliminary designs 
evaluated, experimentation, life cycle cost estimates, formalization of requirements, 
trade-off analyses, validation of concept for next phase with hardware prototypes, re-
assessment of performance risks and plans for thorough testing and evaluation. 
Milestone II Decision - Approval to proceed to Full-scale Development – all 
significant risks have been resolved, technology is in hand to conduct engineering 
efforts 
Phase II - Full-Scale Development Phase – engineering, fabrication and full 
testing of the system.  Low Rate Initial Production usually is shown to occur in this 
phase. 
Milestone III Decision - Approval to proceed to production and initial deployment.  
In practice, this decision was often divided into IIIA (Low Rate Initial Production) and IIIB 
(Full Rate Production) reviews, with IIIA frequently delegated to the individual service 
Secretary. 
Phase III – Full Rate Production and Initial Deployment Phase – production and 
distribution of equipment, and providing of logistical support; product improvements may 
be introduced. 
Milestone IV Decision - A review several years after initial deployment to ensure 
that operational readiness and support objectives are being achieved. 48 
Phase IV – Operational Support Phase – during which the system is continually 
operated by end users and logistically supported. 
Milestone V Decision – Major upgrade or system replacement as needs might 
dictate. 
                                            
48 Fox, J. Ronald, The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition, Harvard Business School 
Press, 1988. 
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 The policy provided that systems undergoing this process could be structured by 
tailoring, with combined phases or exempted from phases of the entire process as 
appropriate. 
The 1991 Model 
In 1991, a major revision of the DoD 5000 series was released, with changes to 
the Life Cycle Systems Management Model.49  It simplified its predecessor by lessening 










































Fig. 8.  Defense Acquisition Milestones and Phases 
This revision of the framework was not a radical departure from its predecessor. 
But the “Full-Scale Development” phase was changed to Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development.  Phase IV Operations and Support was shown as an 
additional, yet not distinctly separate phase. 50 
Determination of Mission Need – not a phase of acquisition but a period of need 
analysis activities ending with Milestone 0 - Concept Studies Approval and Program 
Initiation. 
                                            
49 DoD Directive 5000.1, “Defense Acquisition,” February 23, 1991. 
50 USD(A) Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Defense Acquisition Management Policies and 
Procedures, February 23, 1991. 
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 Concept Exploration and Definition Phase – ending with Milestone I - Concept 
Demonstration Approval. 
Demonstration and Validation Phase - ending with Milestone II - Development 
Approval. 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase - ending with Milestone III - 
Production Approval. 
Production and Deployment Phase - overlaps ongoing Operations and Support, 
and may include Milestone IV decision reviews for Major Modification Approval as 
required. 


































DoD 5000.2-R of March 1996
Fig. 9.  Defense Systems Acquisition Management Process51 
The 1996 revision of the 5000 series was published after a rigorous effort to 
reform the defense acquisition system during the first half of the Clinton administration.  
The model (Fig. 9.) is streamlined and simplified to depict only four phases and four 
decision reviews.  LRIP could occur on either side of Milestone III and frequently did 
                                            
51 Department of Defense 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense, Acquisition Programs and 
Major Automated Information Systems, 1996. 
- 29 - 
 occur in EMD phase as a service Secretary decision.  Demonstration and Validation 
Phase was renamed Program Definition and Risk Reduction.   
Another key change was the very deliberate change in the declaration of 
Program Initiation moving from Milestone 0 to Milestone I.  Program Initiation in this 
series would mean that a JROC-validated, CAIV-based Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD) existed, and that cost schedule and performance objectives were 
defined in an Acquisition Program Baseline, a current threat assessment was 
conducted, Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) was performed, supportability analysis 
completed, sufficient life-cycle resources programmed, and that an acquisition strategy 
was in place.  Program Initiation also served as a benchmark of OSD interest in 
annually reporting to Congress, per 10 USC § 2220(b), the average time period 
between program initiation and Initial Operational Capability (across all ACAT I 
programs of any commodity). In 1994, the average was 115 months.52 
While the same basic kinds of activities were occurring in each phase of this 
model as its predecessor (i.e. concept formulation, prototyping, modeling and 
simulation, advanced development, LRIP, operational testing, etc,), major policy thrusts 
towards reform were: Integrated Product Process Development (IPPD), program 
stability, risk assessment and management, total system approach, total ownership 
costs (TOC), cost as an independent variable (CAIV), program objectives & thresholds, 
non-traditional acquisition, tailoring, continuous improvement, performance (versus 
military) standards and specifications, electronic commerce, environmental 
management, and a host of others. 
The 1996 5000 policy series only consisted of DoDD 5000.1 (14 pages) and DoD 
5000.2-R (114 pages) as the DODI 5000.2 was eliminated.  Regarding program reviews 
or decision points, the PM in this series was allowed to propose the number and level of 
decision reviews: 
                                            
52 Ibid. 
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 At program initiation, and after consideration of the views of the Working-
Level Integrated Product Team (IPT) and Overarching IPT members, the 
PM shall propose, and the MDA shall consider for approval, the 
appropriate milestones, the level of decision for each milestone, and the 
documentation needed for each milestone.  This proposal shall consider 
the size, complexity, and risk of the program.  The determinations made at 
program initiation shall be reexamined at each milestone in light of then-
current program conditions.53 
In October of 2000, drafts of an entirely new model began to circulate. 
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Fig. 10.  Defense Acquisition Management Framework54 
As the Clinton administration was transitioning out in late 2000, the current model 
appeared (Fig. 10.), along with a revision of the 5000 series.  There were major 
changes from the previous three, largely similar, Pre-2000-era models.  Described as 
“three milestones, four phases,” there are actually eight distinct program activity periods 
depicted, including the pre-acquisition activities, and a total of six reviews.  In addition to 
the three major milestone reviews usually seen, interim decision and progress reviews 
had been added within each of the major phases of a program.  
                                            
53 Ibid. 
54 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 
October 23, 2000. 
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 4.7.3.2.5. Interim Progress Review.  The purpose of an interim progress 
review is to confirm that the program is progressing within the phase as 
planned or to adjust the plan to better accommodate progress made to 
date, changed circumstances, or both. If the adjustment involves changing 
the acquisition strategy, the change must be approved by the MDA.  There 
is no required information necessary for this review other than the 
information specifically requested by the decision-maker.55 
However, there was an indication that all of the reviews were not necessary, 
depending on where a program might enter the model. DoDD 5000.1 said, “Tailoring 
shall be applied to various aspects of the acquisition system, including program 
documentation, acquisition phases, the timing and scope of decision reviews, and 
decision levels.  Milestone decision authorities shall promote flexible, tailored 
approaches to oversight and review based on mutual trust and a program's dollar value, 
risk, and complexity.56   
As well, each of the six “work efforts” had its own entrance and exit criteria.57 
Brief descriptions of each were: 
Concept & Technology Development Phase: 
Concept Exploration - Paper studies of alternative concepts for meeting a 
mission need. 
Component Advanced Development - Development of subsystems/components 
that must be demonstrated before integration into a system, and concept/technological 
demonstration of new system concepts 
System Development & Demonstration Phase:  to develop a system, reduce 
program risk, ensure operational supportability, design for producibility, ensure 
affordability, and demonstrate system integration, interoperability, and utility. 
                                            
55 Ibid. 
56 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, October 23, 
2000. 
57 Defense Acquisition Université, DAU Faculty Brief Presentation, November 2000. 
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 System Integration – for reduction of integration riskThe architecture is complete, 
now system integration is applied to demonstrated subsystems and components. 
System Demonstration – to complete development and demonstrate engineering 
development models with combined Development and Operational testing. 
Production and Deployment Phase: 
Production Readiness, LRIP & IOT&E– for Initial Operational Test & Evaluation 
and Live Fire Test & Evaluation of production representative articles.  Manufacturing 
capability will be verified as LRIP Proceeds. 
Full Rate Production & Deployment - where a Beyond LRIP Report may be 
submitted to Congress and review can take place for Full Rate production.  Receiving 
units will attain full operational capability as deployment of the system continues in this 
phase. 
Operations and Support Phase: operation and support of the system, and possibly 
block improvements as required. 
The first acquisition phase, Concept and Technology Development, appeared to 
be a combination of the first two phases of the older acquisition model.  Or perhaps the 
Program Definition and Risk Reduction activities were to be split between Concept and 
Technology Development and System Development and Demonstration phases, 
depending upon activities planned.  
The DoDD 5000.1 iterated strongly that formal recognition of Program Initiation 
was shifting to the right in this new model, “4.7.2.4.2.2.  A favorable Milestone A 
decision DOES NOT yet mean that a new acquisition program has been initiated.”58  
Program Initiation was definitely now shown at Milestone B, with status of operational 
requirement documentation, technological maturity, and resource programming, etc. 
                                            
58 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 
October 23, 2000. 
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 commensurate with what had been Milestone I in the 1996 Model.  Rationale was 
provided for this as, “The practical result of a preference for more mature technology is 
initiation of individual programs at later stages of development, after determination of 
technology maturity.”59   
The policy of this series emphasized: science & technology, interoperability, time-
phased requirements for evolutionary acquisition, integrated test & evaluation, logistics, 
transformation, cost as a military requirement, simulation based acquisition and other 
tenets.  With re-emergence of DoD Instruction 5000.2 (46 pages), and the revised DoD 
Directive 5000.1 (12 pages) and DoD Regulation 5000.2-R (194 pages), the total 
amount of mandatory guidance totaled 252 pages.  However, this new series was to be 
short-lived, as abrupt cancellation of the series occurred on 30 October 2002. 
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Fig. 11.  Defense Acquisition Management Framework60 
The Deputy Secretary of Defense published a cancellation memorandum that 
sounded critical of current acquisition policy: 
                                            
59 Ibid. 
60 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Defense Acquisition, Attachment 2, Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System, October 30, 2002 (Interim Guidance 5000.2, p. 34). 
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 I have determined that the current DoD Directive 5000.1, “The Defense 
Acquisition System,” DoD Instruction 5000.2, “The Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System,” and DoD 5000.2-R, “Mandatory Procedures 
for Major Defense Acquisition Programs(MDAPs) and Major Automated 
Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs,” require revision to 
create an acquisition policy environment that fosters efficiency, flexibility, 
creativity, and innovation.  Therefore, by separate memorandum, I have 
cancelled these documents effective immediately. 
The interim guidance attached to the cancellation memorandum reduced the 
DoDD 5000.1 document from 12 to 6 pages and the DoDI 5000.2 from 46 to 34 pages.  
A new set of policy directives and instructions was to be published within 120 days 
(actually arriving 193 days later). 
However, the acquisition model was to a large extent the same as in the 2000 




                                           
The name of the Component Advanced Development work effort was changed to 
Technology Development. 
The in-phase decision review between Concept Exploration work effort and 
Technology Development work effort, both of the Concept & Technology 
Development Phase, was eliminated. 
The in-phase review in SDD was now defined as the CDR, one of several 
systems engineering technical reviews normally conducted by the Program 
Manager – and roundly criticized by the DODIG and GAO for occurring too 
soon.61 
The cancelled DoD 5000.2-R was also reissued as the Interim Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook dated Oct 30, 2002, and became discretionary guidance.62 
 
61 Office of the DoD Inspector General, The Critical Design Review Process for Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs, Audit Report Number 93-017, November 5, 1992. 
62 Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook October 30, 2002 (Formerly the DoD 5000.2-R, Dated April 5, 
2002). 
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Fig. 12.  Defense Acquisition Management Framework63 
The current 2003 model (Fig. 12.) has five phases and six potential decision 
reviews. Eight total distinct activity periods exist in the model, including pre-acquisition 
activity.  The separation of Concept & Technology Development Phase into two phases:  
Concept Refinement (previously a work effort called Concept Exploration) and 
Technology Development, also reintroduces a decision review.  This time, however, 
Milestone A shifts to the right between the new phases -- at the entry to the Technology 
Development phase.  And where Milestone A was before is now the point of Concept 
Decision (CD), which is required for entrance into the Concept Refinement phase. 
The entrance and exit criteria for each phase and work effort now incorporate the 
introduction of new requirements documents from the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (which has been evolving in parallel to the acquisition system): 
the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), the Capabilities Development Document (CDD), 
and the Capabilities Production Document (CPD).  Interestingly, there has been a large 
state of flux within this Decision Support System, replete with changes in terminology 
                                            
63 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 
May 12, 2003. 
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 and decision models.  The overarching series of instructions governing that 
requirements generation process has also seen two major revisions in the past three 
years.64 
The current 5000 series also includes language on evolutionary acquisition and 
spiral development taken from the National Defense Authorization Act of 2003.  A new 
requirement for a Technology Development Strategy has been introduced to satisfy 
Section 803, Public Law 107-314, National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 
2003.  The ICD is a requirement to enter the Concept Refinement Phase and a 
Technology Development Strategy (TDS) principal output from this phase. 
                                            
64 CJCSM 3170.01 Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, June 24, 
2003. 
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 Understanding the Implicit Aspects of the Post-2000-
Era Models 
Many of the changes from the straightforward Pre-2000-era framework have yet 
to be realized across the DoD acquisition workforce.  Of over 250 students at the GS-13 
through 15 level that we have surveyed across two services and four major acquisition 
commands, the vast majority have been unfamiliar with the most significant changes.  
Most cannot name from memory the latest phases and milestones.65  The shift between 
the gradually changing 1987-1996 models and the three rapidly changing 2000-era 
versions has been dramatic.  Even without the succeeding adjustments in 2002 and 
2003, there are many explicit and implicit aspects to this model that are particularly 
noteworthy for discussion because of their significant consequences for acquisition 
managers.  The 2000-era and forward DoD 5000 series has promulgated a program 
framework with more phases, more decision reviews, and with some of those reviews 
elevated to a higher level.  The relative placement of milestone reviews with other 
program activities is also significant. 
Number and Level of Milestone and Program Decision Reviews: 
The most apparent, and perhaps least significant, change between eras was 
from numerical to alphabetical designation of major milestone reviews.  A more subtle 
and important change was the appearance of divided phases and within-phase decision 
and progress reviews.  With the latest release of the regulatory series, these additional 
sub-phases or “work efforts,” along with “pre-acquisition activities” have brought the 
total number of distinct activity intervals to eight, with as many as five phases and six 
decision reviews – more than at any time past.  The work efforts are not called “phases” 
however. Each of these efforts has its own entrance and exit criteria, making them more 
in practice like a distinct phase of acquisition.   
                                            
65 Author’s unpublished results of student surveys taken during the course: MN4366 Program 
Management and Leadership as part of the Advanced Acquisition Program, Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2001-2003. 
- 38 - 
 Reviews are described in the current policy to be decision points where decision 
makers can either stop, extend or grant permission to proceed into the next phase.  
Program reviews of any kind at the OSD level have a significant impact on program 
offices.  Much documentation must be prepared and many preparatory meetings are 
conducted enroute to the ultimate review.  And while non-milestone reviews are 
generally considered to be lesser in scope of effort to prepare for, a considerable 
amount of effort managing the decision process is still expended.  Documentation 
required for various milestone and decision reviews is shown below (Fig. 13.): 
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Fig. 13.  Documentation for Decision Reviews66 
                                            
66 Defense Acquisition Université, Program Managers Toolkit, 13th edition (Ver 1.0), June 2003. 
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 The latest edition of the Program Managers Toolkit shows a figure that has long 
been familiar to Program Managers, showing a six-month timeline of activities leading to 
a review.  This same six-month timeframe for preparation of an OSD-level review has 
been unchanged for many years (Fig. 14.).   
 
Fig. 14.  Timelines for a Defense Acquisition Board Review67 
What this simple schematic cannot fully convey is the amount of meetings and 
preparatory briefings to staff members and committees.  Some representatives from 
program management offices keep an accounting of travel and labor costs associated 
with a milestone reviews for an MDAP system.  While only anecdotal data was available 
for this research, it is easy to surmise that a substantial amount of program office 
funding would be expended on support contractor assistance with supporting analyses 
                                            
67 Ibid. 
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 and documentation, as well as frequent travel to the Pentagon, and other associated 
expenses in preparation for high-level reviews.68  As of this writing, there are a total of 
25 MDAP programs in the Department of Defense. 
And though little written guidance yet exists for the new Design Readiness 
Review (DRR) in the midst of the SDD phase, it can be presumed to be an extensive 
effort. This review evolved from an in-phase IPR in the 2000 series to a Critical Design 
Review in the 2002 Interim Guidance model to its current name.  Such a review at OSD-
level is in keeping with the increased emphasis now being placed on technological 
assessment mentioned earlier.  What is significant to PMs is that such a review, at least 
in the name of Critical Design Review, was previously one of several program-level 
technical reviews – chaired by the PM – within a disciplined systems engineering effort.  
It is an extensive review that can span days in length.  How this review will be 
conducted remains to be seen, as of this writing, but it seems to be an entirely new 
approach to elevate a technical review to service or OSD level. 
With Evolutionary Acquisition as the preferred strategy, notional systems are now 
shown as shorter developments (in SDD) with iterative Milestone B-to-C cycles.  The 
new DoDI 5000.2 prescribes that, “In an evolutionary acquisition program, the 
development of each increment shall begin with a Milestone B, and production resulting 
from that increment shall begin with a Milestone C.”69  Thus, program managers can 
expect to undergo the reviews determined appropriate for the initial increment of 
development in their program, as well as reviews specified for the follow-on increments. 
The most recent published guidance shows one example of a system with no 
less than fourteen reviews in its first eleven years from Concept Decision (see Fig. 15.). 
 
                                            
68 Author’s unpublished interview with an anonymous representative from a major program office going 
through a milestone review, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, February 19, 2003. 
69 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. 
May 12, 2003. 














Fig. 15.  Example of Program Structure Showing Two Successive Development Increments and Their 
Associated Reviews70 
Program Initiation Moves Further to the Right: 
In all three Post-2000-era models, Milestone B is now the point of “program 
initiation,” and although some early graphic depictions71 of the new model showed a 
correlation to Milestone I of the 1996 version, this milestone actually correlates more 
closely to the old Milestone II in terms of system technical maturity (and other program 
events) under this latest era of models.   
For transition of programs already underway, the following guidance was given in 
October of 2000: 
4.5.  Programs planned in accordance with the 1996 version of DoDD 
5000.1 (reference (g)) and DoD 5000.2-R (reference (h)) shall be 
executed in accordance with approved program documentation.  That 
documentation shall not be updated solely to satisfy the requirements of 
this Instruction.  Programs already approved to enter Engineering and 
                                            
70 Defense Acquisition Université, Program Managers Toolkit, 13th edition (Ver 1.0), June 2003. 
71 Defense Acquisition Université, DAU Faculty Brief Presentation, November 2000. 
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 Manufacturing Development shall continue to follow the sequence of 
milestones established in their program documentation.  The new policies 
in this Instruction, including the new decision points and phases, shall be 
applied to efforts that have not yet been approved as acquisition programs 
(usually pre-Milestone I) unless otherwise directed by the MDA.  The new 
policies in this Instruction, including the new decision points and phases, 
shall be applied to programs that are post-Milestone I but that are not yet 
in Engineering and Manufacturing Development at the discretion of the 
MDA.  For purposes of complying with applicable laws, Milestone A will 
serve as Milestone 0; Program Initiation, when it occurs at or during 
Component Advanced Development, will serve as Milestone I; Milestone B 
will serve as Milestone II; Milestone C will serve as the Low-Rate Initial 
Production decision point; and the Full-Rate Production Decision Review 
will serve as Milestone III.  In addition, System Development and 
Demonstration will serve as Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development.72 
This passage communicates some degree of resultant complexity involved with 
changing terminology and sequencing of milestones and reviews, and of programs 
proceeding under multiple sets of rules and lexicon.  At least one service published 
explanatory guidance for its programs to help delineate which set of rules would apply 
to particular programs,73 resulting in the use of two acquisition models for a time. 
Moving program initiation “further to the right” in program terminology allows for 
more time to be spent firming requirements, assuring that funding is in place, and 
development of an acquisition strategy before declaration as a formal program.  
Perhaps the thinking is that a later official start of a program will assure an earlier finish, 
as it were.  But to not acknowledge (via “program initiation”) that a program is underway 
in two successive acquisition periods beyond need analysis period seems to this author 
somewhat illogical or disingenuous. 
                                            
72 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 
October 23, 2000. 
73 Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, The New Defense Acquisition 
Policies and Army Positions, December 2000. 
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 Technological Maturity before Program Commitment: 
The Milestone B distinction was (and still is) important because it places program 
initiation at the point where the commencement of advanced development, not 
prototyping, will occur.  The 1996-era policy designated program initiation at Milestone I, 
the onset of PDRR, and in the 1991-era policy it was even earlier -- at Milestone 0. This 
deferral of formal program recognition until a later stage of technical maturity is an 
explicit delay of departmental commitment.  The formal declaration of product (versus 
technology) development likely stems from two GAO Reports (reports number 02-39 
and 99-162) that recommended increased product knowledge prior to business 
commitment. And recall as well the reporting requirement to congress on the 
development time between program initiation and initial operational capability.  Again, a 
delay in declaration of program initiation will at least appear to shorten cycle time if 
advanced development and production timelines remain unchanged. 
As with previous policy throughout multiple versions of the DoD 5000 series on 
tailoring of acquisition programs, it is emphasized again that, appropriate to their 
concept and technology maturity, programs can enter the process at various points in 
the new model.  Language in DoD 5000.2 supports the policy thrust that technical 
assessment will be an important part of program assessment: 
3.7.2.2. Technology developed in S&T or procured from industry or other 
sources shall have been demonstrated in a relevant environment or, 
preferably, in an operational environment to be considered mature enough 
to use for product development in systems integration.  Technology 
readiness assessments, and where necessary, independent assessments, 
shall be conducted.  If technology is not mature, the DoD Component shall 
use alternative technology that is mature and that can meet the user’s 
needs.74 
The interim guidebook prescribes the use of definitive Technology Readiness 
Levels or other measuring tools to be assigned to critical technologies of the developing 
                                            
74 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 
May 12, 2003. 
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 system by Component S&T Executive and passed up the chain.  These too had been 
emphasized earlier by the GAO (see report number 02-39). 
Clearly, a frustration of the past has been the setbacks and resultant lengthening 
of advanced development phases from efforts to employ the very latest in emerging 
technology.  But it can be argued that time saved in a shorter advanced development 
(SDD) phase can only result from more time spent in the preceding phases of Concept 
Refinement and Technology Development, with uncertainty of any genuine program 
cycle time reduction.   
In the past, technology development during the advanced development (EMD) 
phase was blamed for undue costs and lengthening of this phase.  But a very real 
concern may now be that -- unless SDD is greatly shortened -- attaining technological 
maturity at Milestone B instead of C guarantees the fielding of “yesterday’s technology 
tomorrow.” 
In other words, there is a very real but somewhat understated distinction between 
what was Milestone III under the 1996 model and what is now Milestone C under the 
Post-2000 era models, beyond that of LRIP and Full Rate Production.  Evolutionary 
acquisition under the new model prescribes the initiation of low-rate production of an 
80% solution at Milestone C as the preferred approach.  In order to achieve the 100% 
capability solution desired in the same time frame as would be planned under the 
single-step acquisition strategy, the model is perhaps more accurately depicted as 
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Fig. 16.  Actual Comparison of 1996 and Post-2000-era Acquisition Framework Models 
Again, what is most apparent here is the increased number of decision reviews, 
as well as the concurrent activities involved in managing the follow-on development 
increment and its requisite reviews as well.  Assuming advanced development (SDD) is 
indeed shortened, and further assuming that concept and early prototyping phases are 
no longer than before, the time and effort on control activities appears almost certainly 
excessive within the same system delivery timeline. 
Funding Implications: 
Post-2000-era policy requires full funding for programs no later than Milestone B, 
and transition funding is needed to support any later entry into the acquisition process.  
The long held definition of “full funding” (pertaining to the total cost associated with an 
authorized quantity of militarily usable end items for a procurement within the fiscal 
year) was expanded to have a second meaning: 
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 A requirement for formal program initiation of an acquisition program.  In 
this sense, full funding means having an approved current (and projected) 
resource stream to execute the program, i.e., program funding is included 
both in the budget and in the out-years of the FYDP sufficient to cover the 
current and future efforts described in the acquisition strategy (emphasis 
mine).  Funding requirements will be adjusted at least annually as the 
program advances through its life cycle.75 
This expansion of this term may serve as some assurance to OSD that programs 
will be less likely to exceed program estimates if only initiated when all forecasted 
resources are in place.  DoDI 5000.2 states that: 
Transition into SDD also requires full funding (i.e., inclusion of the dollars 
and manpower needed for all current and future efforts (emphasis mine) to 
carry out the acquisition strategy in the budget and out-year program), 
which shall be programmed when a system concept and design have 
been selected, a PM has been assigned, requirements have been 
approved, and system-level development is ready to begin.76 
However, with regard to Evolutionary Acquisition as the preferred approach to 
satisfying operational needs, there are two development processes that may be 
implemented: (a) Incremental Development – where the end-state requirement is 
known, and requirement will be met over time in several increments, and (b) Spiral 
Development – where desired capability is identified, but end-state requirements are not 
known at program initiation, and requirements for future increments are dependent upon 
technology maturation and user feedback from initial increments.  Of these two 
processes, Spiral Development shall be the preferred process.  
If we recall Wideman’s caution about indefinite numbers of spirals, a special 
challenge is presented for obtaining realistic full funding estimates for programs with 
uncertain requirements and numbers of increments.  If indeed, shorter cycles are 
facilitated by evolutionary acquisition, skillful financial management (programming and 
                                            
75 Defense Acquisition Université, Glossary – Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms, 10th Edition, 
January 2001. 
76 USD(AT&L) Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 
May 12, 2003. 
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 budgeting) will be required to effectively enable the availability of funding as 
requirements for successive blocks are realized. 
The Significance of Milestone C, and IOT&E after the LRIP 
Decision: 
The designation of LRIP now as an OSD decision for MDAPs in many cases 
heightens the level of this review (and the associated effort for same discussed earlier).  
As mentioned before, Low Rate Initial Production was often delegated to service 
Secretaries and was a concurrent activity within the advanced development phase.  The 
advanced development paradigm is now changed: there will continue to be 
development activity after the initiation of production, but all production is now viewed 
as a separate phase of the system’s life cycle.  Production has traditionally been the 
phase where larger portions of program funds are spent, with the following Operations 
and Support phase even larger. 
Also, while not specifically stated, the placement of IOT&E after the Milestone C 
decision might imply to some that only LRIP articles are to be used in Initial Operational 
Test and Evaluation.  But the DoD 5000.2 states that production or production 
representative articles may be used, so there is no apparent preclusion from using SDD 
articles. The Operational Test and Evaluation community has long attempted to require 
only production representative articles to be used in operational testing.  However, the 
concurrency of engineering activities to exploit task lead-lag times for schedule 
reduction has often thwarted this objective.  IOT&E was previously conducted during the 
advanced development phase.  It was viewed as an event that proved out development 
by testing the completed system in an operational environment with end users.  
Programs had sometimes transitioned into Low Rate Initial Production, and had 
simultaneously gone into operational test with engineering articles from the advanced 
development phase.  
LRIP is now part of the production phase.  And if LRIP articles are to be used as 
test items for IOT&E, program managers will have to intensively manage (in order to 
- 49 - 
 minimize) the time period between permission to award the production contract, 
produce, and receive deliverables to use in IOT&E, and subsequently support a Full-
Rate Production Review.  As in the past, DOT&E specifies how many test articles will 
be used in IOT&E, and must render a supportive Beyond LRIP report directly to 
congress before programs can proceed with Full Rate Production. 
Impact upon the Requirements Generation System: 
The Requirements Generation System employs Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff instructions and manuals for policy guidance regarding processes in their purview.  
The CJCSI 3170.01A of 10 August 1999 showed linkage to the Acquisition System with 
the following graphical representation of Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
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Fig. 17.  Requirements Generation and Acquisition System Interface 3170.01A, August 1999 
The next version of the CJCSI 3170.01B of 15 April 2001 displayed the new 
model (Fig. 18.) and allowed that there would be two models for JROC and Acquisition 
interfacing: “Programs planned in accordance with the 1999 version of the DOD 5000 
series will be executed per their approved program documentation.” 
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Fig. 18.  Requirements Generation and Acquisition System Interface 3170.01B, April 2001 
Issuance of the CJCSI 3170.01C on 24 June 03 simplifies their process, showing 
only three affirmations of requirements via JROC in support of the JCIDS and 
acquisition processes (and is in variance with Program Managers Toolkit showing 
JROCs in support of Milestone B, C, and FRP, Fig. 19.). 
 
Fig. 19.  Requirements Generation and Acquisition System Interface CJCSI 3170.01C, June 2003 
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 What is very apparent in this new model for requirements generation is its 
illustration of newly established documents that drive the acquisition system, and where 
they will each emerge in the parallel processes.  The ICD generally correlates to the 
long-established MNS.  The CDD generally correlates to the long-established ORD.  
The CPD, however, is a new reflection of what will be the then-achievable requirements 
that the combined communities agree to produce.  This is a new move toward 
requirements flexibility that reflects what developers have struggled with for some time:  
requirements become discovered and more fully understood as the system matures.  
Being locked into unattainable requirements has proven costly.  Requirements have 
often been both difficult to attain and perhaps as difficult to change.  The new CJCS 
instruction therefore provides for more flexibility in the requirements determining 
process. 
Also obvious in the model is a top-down approach to requirements that is intrinsic 
in the accompanying written policy guidance.  While well beyond the scope of this 
research effort, it must be pointed out that a significant step has been taken in this new 
policy to centralize control of the requirements process, in an effort to ensure not only 
consolidation and optimization of investment efforts that come from this process, but 
interoperability between systems and services as well. 
On the whole, the Post-2000-era acquisition models prescribe a very new 
paradigm, and only time can inform us whether Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s goals of 
program management flexibility and innovation have been achieved.  No program has 
yet gone through the entire model, and none will for many years to come. 
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 Centralized Control of Defense Acquisition Programs 
The U.S. Constitution clearly established civilian control of the military and spells 
out the powers and responsibilities of Congress with regard to it.  The 1947 National 
Security Act and subsequent amendments established civilian control of the military 
within a newly created Department of Defense, and there has since been an ongoing, 
competitive tension between military and civilian members over power and control even 
within this organization.  The centralized authority of the Secretary of Defense and his 
staff was further strengthened in later amendments, particularly in the tenure of Robert 
McNamara (1961-68), renowned for his institution of PPBS, etc.77 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 shifted some power to the combatant 
commanders in formulation of equipment requirements via the JROC, but also shifted 
military and civilian (mostly military) program manager personnel to the control of the 
civilian led service secretariats.  It too led the way for a separate professionalized 
acquisition corps that would develop experienced and educated program managers to 
administer their programs efficiently and effectively. 
Nevertheless, time spent “managing the bureaucracy” has remained an 
encumbrance to PMs.  Back in 1988-89, military research fellows studying commercial 
practices at the Defense Systems Management College wrote about an imbalance of 
authority between PMs and the OSD staff.78  Of eleven improvements they 
recommended to the acquisition process, number three on their list was, “Reduce the 
number and level of program decision milestones.”  Showing the 1987 model, they 
recommended that only one of the then five reviews be conducted at OSD level:  the 
review for advanced development.  They quoted the 1986 Packard Commission’s 
conclusions, which said, “He (the PM) should be fully committed to abide by the 
                                            
77 Fox, J. Ronald, The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition, Harvard Business School 
Press, 1988. 
78 Defense Systems Management College, Using Commercial Practices in DoD Acquisition, December 
1989. 
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 program’s specified baseline and, so long as he does so, the Defense and Service 
Acquisition Executives should support his program and permit him to manage it.  This 
arrangement would provide much needed program stability.”79  
Going back even further to 1981, Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger and his 
Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci had instituted thirty-two acquisition reforms that took 
aim at centralized control by the senior civilian advisors in the Pentagon.  He 
streamlined the milestone decision review process at OSD level from four milestone 
reviews to only two.  But as Fox points out, there are no sovereign powers in 
Washington, but many independent ones, capable of impeding initiatives of others.80   
Indeed the Defense Acquisition Board is a powerful decision making board when 
it convenes, but until it does, it is a diverse committee of disparate interests with powers 
of “no” among many individuals and powers of “yes” to none.  Frequent reviews may 
lead to numerous program adjustments, much as is done now with resource shuffling 
with program funding.  The time and effort spent in managing the bureaucracy, versus 
the program, is a major activity of PMs, and repeated adjustments are opposed to 
program stability. 
Mentioned earlier was that contingency theory encourages senior leaders to find 
the best fit for their organization’s structure to its environment, understanding that some 
situations might call for rigid bureaucratic structure while others might require a more 
flexible, organic one.  The concept of control is also a cornerstone of cybernetics:  the 
study of organizations, communications and control in complex systems.  It focuses on 
looped feedback mechanisms, where the controller communicates to the controlled 
what is the desired future state, and the controlled communicates to the controller 
                                            
79 Packard Commission, A Quest for Excellence, Final Report to the President, 1986. 
80 Fox, J. Ronald, The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition, Harvard Business School 
Press, 1988. 
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 information with which to form perceptions for use in comparing states.  The controller 
then communicates (directs) purposeful behavior.81   
The fundamental need for communications constrains the options for control, 
making the communications architecture a critically important feature of the control 
system.  It is often heard that with communications in today’s information age warfare, 
we seek to “act within the enemy’s decision cycle.”  For acquisition decision makers, the 
information architecture is the command and control hierarchy within our bureaucracy.  
And the decision cycle in the course of a program (shown in Fig. 14) still, after many 
years, reflects 180 days of typical preparation lead-time for a decision review.   
Mises, Hayek and Kirzner, in their work described a “knowledge problem” with 
regard to centralized planning and control: 
The knowledge problem stems from the fact that a planner, especially a 
central planner, may fail to achieve an attainable goal because of the 
inadequacies of the planner’s knowledge.  Central planners are usually 
unaware of their own ignorance concerning the facts relevant to their 
social plans.  Because the central planner cannot know everything about 
the problem he is confronted with, his knowledge must take the form of 
what he thinks he knows about the dispersed bits of knowledge that can 
be obtained.  He uses these bits of dispersed knowledge to implement his 
social plan, but he may be unaware of other bits of knowledge that could 
have been relevant to achieve an objective.  It is highly unlikely that a 
central planner can always know where to find, or how to look for, all the 
necessary bits of dispersed information known in the economic system 
relevant to a problem at hand.  This is most problematic since it makes it 
impossible for the central planner to be fully cognizant of the nature of, or 
of the amount of gaps in, his own knowledge.  The tragedy of central 
planning toward industrial policy is that even the best-intentioned central 
planner is unaware of the knowledge problem, which is the ignorance of 
his own ignorance.82 
                                            
81 Ashby, W. R., An Introduction to Cybernetics, London: Chapman & Hall, 1960. 
82 Kirzner, I. M., The Meaning of Market Process: Essays in the Development of Modern Austrian 
Economics, London: Routledge, (1992) and Cleveland, Paul A. and Price, Jared R., The Independent 
Review, A Journal of Political Economy, The Failure of FAA Regulation, Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 2003. 
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 Similarly, when Rand authors wrote about DoD decision making pertaining to 
training, equipping, manning, and operating the force, they suggested that decisions 
should be based upon senior leadership’s desired outcomes.  They also suggest that 
leaders consider hedging with more wagers versus single large bets – meaning use of 
more brains versus one.  They acknowledge that with a decentralized management 
style comes dilution of responsibility and accountability, unless vigilance of execution is 
maintained.  But they agree with other theorists that centralized decision making was 
consistent with the Cold War, and a style well-suited to the 1960s, but can be stifling 
and can restrict innovation.83 
Pinchot’s Intelligent Organization does not call for decentralization to undermine 
bureaucracy, but to improve it.  He advocates decentralization with horizontal 
interconnection (a network organization) between business units, to lessen the reliance 
upon going up the chain of command and down again for communication flow and 
decision.  Rather than total autonomy for PMs, he supports self-management, from 
trust, with responsibility and accountability.84  This thinking seems particularly 
appropriate to a professionalized bureaucracy such as the DoD acquisition workforce, 
with disciplined standards of training, education, and experience steadily progressing 
since implementation of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) 
in the early 1990s. 
Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, also mentioned earlier, basically asserts that 
PMs must be able to see, understand, and act with variety upon their environment to 
survive (my application).  Morgan cautions that senior leaders must communicate 
strategy, resource flows, and timelines, and create a broad structure of accountability.  If 
instead he is over controlling, he will negate any variety or innovative potential a 
                                            
83 Johnson, Stuart, Libicki, Martin C. and Treverton, Gregory F., New Challenges New Tools for Defense 
Decisionmaking, Rand 2003. 
84 Pinchot, Gifford and Elizabeth, The End of Bureaucracy and the Rise of the Intelligent Organization, 
Berrett-Koehler Publishers, San Francisco, 1993. 
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 subordinate unit may possess – having to focus on internal rules and controls vice 
dealing with the local challenges being faced.85 
                                            
85 Adapted from Morgan, Gareth, 1997, Images of Organization, Sage Publications. 
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 Conclusions 
Great strides have been made in acquisition of defense systems over the past 
two decades, the best proof of which might be from the performance of these systems 
in the Persian Gulf War, the Kosovo campaign, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and other 
operations.  Still, there are always improvements to be made via revisions in policy and 
the implementation thereof.  Likewise, there is a need on the part of implementers to 
consider not only what the current policy states, but what the secondary and tertiary 
effects of changes might be. 
Acquisition models reflect explicit and even implicit aspects of acquisition policy.  
The author’s research has not sought to thoroughly analyze all acquisition policy in the 
past sixteen years, but to provide something of a brief chronicle of what has transpired 
within the acquisition framework, and to suggest implications of the most recent models 
with regard to organizational theory.  Also presented was some perspective from 
models phasing the activities of large and complex projects in non-DoD business areas. 
As can be seen in these models, changes to the DoD acquisition system have 
been evolutionary, with an accelerated rate of change in the last three years.  So too, 
has the DoD’s external environment rapidly changed in these first years of the 21st 
Century, with more emphasis on combating global terrorism and homeland security.  
This amount of change in the environment and turbulence in the policy can easily lend 
to confusion in the field.  Moreover, serious consideration must be given to DoD’s 
internal organizational control strategy apposite to a new age in acquisition. 
It is evident that the debate about centralized control and number of OSD-level 
reviews has been taking place for a long time.  The current model increases the number 
and levels of reviews, and their placement with regard to program events indicate that 
we are moving toward an even more centralized approach to control of acquisition 
programs.   
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 This is in contrast to the stated policy and what has been publicized about it: 
The [new] policies achieve Wolfowitz's and Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Edward C. “Pete” Aldridge's 
objectives by giving acquisition decision makers much greater authority to 
tailor program strategies to fit the needs of their program.  Greater 
emphasis is now placed on evolutionary acquisition as the preferred 
strategy for rapidly acquiring advanced warfighting capability.  Program 
managers are now given the flexibility to be creative and efficient in the 
way they apply policy to their programs.  The policies are designed to 
release the power of innovation in every member of the acquisition, 
technology and logistics workforce.86 
But what is perhaps even more significant than this observation is that moving 
toward greater centralization of control at the higher levels may be a cause for serious 
concern, given predominant management theory cited herein.  The mainstream of 
thought indicates that more efficiency and effectiveness might be gained from a different 
approach to an external environment of instability and uncertainty, whether from unclear 
threats and uncertain scenarios, or from complexities of technology and systems 
acquisition. 
Centralization of control is a management issue to be dealt with – the challenge 
to avoid anarchy, with no guidelines or parameters, as well as excessive control.  Might 
programs actually be lengthened by more cumbersome reviews?  Whether fourteen 
reviews in eleven years are too many is a matter of conjecture and more debate.  
However, it is obvious that there are today more reviews than ever before, and these do 
have a requisite cost associated with their execution.  We will likely continue the 
struggle to find the appropriate balance between centralized functions at OSD and 
autonomy for the management of programs in both explicit or implicit management 
policies and frameworks. 
Likewise, the implications of delayed program initiation and shift of Initial 
Operational Test and Evaluation until after the start of production have yet to be 
                                            
86 United States Department of Defense, News Release No. 327-03, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/releases.html, May 14, 2003. 
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 realized.  A delay of advanced development almost certainly means more time to be 
spent on the earlier development processes.  And loss of concurrency via the 
sequencing of LRIP and IOT&E similarly threatens to lengthen at least some programs 
that could have performed these activities simultaneously. 
An obvious area for further research is on the subject of actual costs associated 
with senior level decision reviews. However, investigational opportunities might also 
include several questions pertaining to the application of evolutionary acquisition and its 
potential resultant impacts on Initial Operational Test and Evaluation, configuration 
management,  “lot, model, & type diversity,” and associated supportability concerns.  
Lastly, Pinchot’s “horizontal interconnections” among business units may hold the key to 
ultimate effectiveness and efficiency within a large professional bureaucracy such as 
the DoD.  A study of how the DoD might exploit its current capacity via increased 
horizontal communication might provide insight toward attaining the decentralized 
empowerment it advocates. 
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